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AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING 
THE REGULATORY STATE. By Cass R. Sunstein.t Cam-
bridge, Ma.: Harvard Univ. Press. 1990. Pp. xi, 284. Cloth, 
$25.00. 
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRffiCAL INTRODUC-
TION. Daniel A. Farber2 and Philip P. Frickey.3 Chicago, 
11.: Univ. of Chicago Press. 1991. Pp. 159. Cloth, $34.95. 
Paper, $13.95. 
Herbert Hovenkamp4 
These two provocative volumes, the first more constructive, the 
second more analytic, deal with some of the most important and 
vexing questions about policy making in our democratic, capitalist 
state. These questions concern government's ability and ultimate 
entitlement to interfere with the unrestrained market in furtherance 
of the public interest. 
Cass R. Sunstein has written a short but far-ranging book that 
is certain to set the tone for many debates over the appropriate role 
of the welfare and administrative state in the aftermath of the War-
ren Era "rights revolution." He joins issue with many of the 1980s 
ideas that are hostile toward the regulatory state, particularly from 
the law and economics movement, the public choice movement, and 
the accompanying policy revolution that characterized the Reagan 
Administration. He then attempts to reconstruct and defend a vi-
sion of the liberal, interventionist state from most of these attacks. 
Sunstein begins with an all too brief history of government reg-
ulation, focusing chiefly on the rise of the modem regulatory state 
during the New Deal, and continuing through the "rights revolu-
tion" of the 1960s and 1970s. For Sunstein as for others, the New 
Deal is a watershed in the history of regulation. The regulatory 
regimes established during the New Deal collectively formed a 
"wholesale assault on the system of common law ordering" and 
transferred to the federal executive branch much of the regulatory 
control that had previously been the domain of the states and the 
courts. Sunstein generally applauds both these developments, 
I. Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Dept. of Political 
Science, University of Chicago. 
2. Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
3. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
4. Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
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although he has some reservations about particular regulatory 
excursions. 
He then re-examines the basic economic and political ratio-
nales for regulation and the most telling criticisms of it. In the pro-
cess he develops a model of regulation that is sympathetic to its 
goals and also accounts for its diversity. 
Sunstein generally rejects attacks on regulation "that are 
rooted in modem welfare economics and in pre-New Deal princi-
ples of private right." His principal complaint about welfare eco-
nomics is that by its nature economics assumes that individual 
preferences precede society and the State. But an important pur-
pose of Madisonian government, and thus of regulation, is to form 
preferences. When viewed in this fashion, the history of regulatory 
interference with the market gives much greater cause for optimism. 
At the same time, however, Sunstein's survey of federal regulatory 
programs finds ample evidence of failure as well as success. The 
lesson to be learned is thus not that regulation is inherently bad, but 
that it is vulnerable to misinterpretation and abuse. Law makers, 
especially courts, must respond to this knowledge in such a way as 
to make regulation work, and to minimize the opportunities for 
harmful self-dealing. 
One frustrating part of Sunstein's book is an extremely short 
section responding to the powerful critiques of post-New Deal regu-
lation during the 1970s and 1980s. For example, Sunstein dismisses 
in a few sentences the great debate at the boundaries of welfare eco-
nomics about whether welfare must be measured strictly in terms of 
current, individual, market-revealed preferences, or whether other 
indicia of happiness or well-being can be taken into account. In the 
process of making this argument, however, Sunstein suggests an im-
portant point: most of the economic attacks on the regulatory state 
rest on a premise that restricts the meaning of "welfare" to that 
which it has within neoclassical economics-a regime in which sub-
jective utilities are presumed not to be interpersonally comparable 
and the meaning of "welfare" is identified with revealed market 
preference. However, most of these arguments fall apart when one 
permits broader measures of welfare, drawing upon data from a 
wider variety of sources and from disciplines other than economics. 
Sunstein also rejects in a short space the contractarian argu-
ment that legislative interference with voluntary market transac-
tions is justified only when the changes are supported by unanimous 
consent. Sunstein suggests that this position depends on a presump-
tion that the existing distribution is "prepolitical, or just, or sup-
ported by unanimous consent at some privileged earlier stage." Of 
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course, contractarian arguments may depend on no such presump-
tion, but simply on notions of reliance, or alternatively, that no mat-
ter how unjust or impoverished the current state, only unanimous 
consent provides reliable evidence that welfare is improved under 
any alternative state. Sunstein also seeks to counter the broad-
based economic argument that regulation is nothing more than rent 
seeking by noting that an extremely vibrant liberal tradition in the 
United States suggests that much governmental participation is not 
rent-seeking at all but good citizenship-people seek regulatory 
rules because they believe the rules are in the public interest. 
Sunstein then concludes that the case against the minimalist 
state and in favor of regulation is strong, and rests on three funda-
mental points. First, individual preferences are not simply given, or 
inherent in the human constitution, but are determined by the ex-
isting legal regime. As a result, defending the existing, antistatist 
legal regime by reference to individual preferences involves us in a 
circular argument. Second, regulatory programs are much more 
necessary than some economists believe to solve free rider and col-
lective action problems. Third, on other grounds than number one, 
private preferences need not always be respected, since they can and 
should be overridden by the collective will; further, preferences are 
determined by what the market makes available. For example, 
some tribes of American Indians placed only a low value on alco-
holic beverages offered to them by European traders until the trad-
ers succeeded in establishing a "consumption history." 
Sunstein's assessment of why and how regulation fails begins 
with a survey that finds wide disparities in the relative success sto-
ries of various regulatory regimes. Sunstein cites rule making by 
the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) as having particularly 
unimpressive records. But there are more successes than failures in 
his story. Moreover, the failures can be explained. In some cases 
the regulation was badly-intentioned from the beginning-usually 
nothing more than a wealth transfer passed at the behest of a rent-
seeking interest group. Other cases can be explained by a failure to 
diagnose the problem or by rigid legislation that either constrains 
private firms' ability to find the optimal solution or submits them to 
an unrealistic timetable. He cites automobile emission control stan-
dards as an example of such difficulties. Other failures result from 
unanticipated consequences or system-wide effects that result from 
regulation that was intended to be local or specific. Related to this 
is a failure of one set of regulatory statutes to coordinate with an-
other set. Still other regulatory failures result from changed cir-
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cumstance or obsolescence: the regulation may have been well 
designed for the problem that was perceived to exist at the time the 
regime was passed. However, subsequently either the problem 
changed or information has become available that has changed our 
perspective about the problem. 
In addition to these numerous causes for the conceptual failure 
of regulatory regimes, Sunstein cites several instances of what he 
calls "implementation failure" -situations where the regulatory 
statute may have been well designed for the problem confronted, 
but the agency delegated the task of establishing and enforcing the 
regulatory regime has not performed the task well. 
The second half of Sunstein's book is concerned with issues of 
statutory interpretation, designed to enable both legislative drafters 
and courts-primarily the latter-to establish regulatory regimes 
that work in the public interest. To this end, Sunstein concludes 
that the interpretive task "inevitably requires courts (and others) to 
develop and rely on background principles that cannot be tied to 
any legislative enactment." However, reliance on such principles is 
both inevitable and "a potentially valuable part of the fabric of 
modern public law." 
Sunstein proposes principles of statutory interpretation 
designed to account for regulatory failure without being hostile to 
the general enterprise of regulation. His basic disagreement with 
the strictures imposed by public choicers on statutory interpretation 
appears to be that they begin the process with unabashed hostility 
toward most regulation in general. This hostility leads public 
choice to such conclusions as that legislation should be viewed as no 
more than contracts, or "deals" between the legislature and special 
interest groups, in which the interest groups are entitled to get what 
they bargained for and no more. 
The centerpiece of Professor Sunstein's book is chapter five, 
which presents a set of interpretive principles for the reconstructed 
regulatory state, designed to take many of the criticisms of public 
choice and the general doctrine of regulatory failure seriously, but 
not so seriously so as to undermine all trust in regulation. Some of 
the principles are orthodox and seem quite uncontroversial: if the 
federal government wishes to preempt state law, it should state so 
clearly; statutes that raise constitutional doubts should be construed 
narrowly. Others are more venturesome: "statutes that embody 
mere interest-group deals should be narrowly construed," and 
"[c]ourts should construe statutes so as to increase the likelihood 
that decisions will be made by officials who are politically accounta-
ble and highly visible." Clearly, such principles place rather high 
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burdens on courts, and require them to look far beyond the text. 
Other proposed principles are far ranging, with implications that 
can only be imagined, and with a content that is frustratingly am-
biguous. For example, Sunstein urges that the law that one must 
show a discriminatory intent to make out an equal protection clause 
violation should give way to the view that a statute need have only a 
disproportionate, discriminatory impact to "raise constitutional 
doubts." Certainly Sunstein would not argue that all statutes with a 
disparate impact are unconstitutional. So the phrase "raise consti-
tutional doubts" must mean that some will survive and some will 
not-but this leaves an extraordinary amount of room for judicial 
discretion. 
Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey's book is a first rate introduc-
tion to the public choice literature for someone who does not have a 
technical background in economics and who looks at public choice 
through a lawyer's eyes. The entire thrust of Law and Public 
Choice is that there is something that can be characterized as a "ju-
risprudence" of public choice: that the public choice literature has 
something important to say to legal policy makers such as legisla-
tors and judges. Not all of those engaged in public choice inquiries 
would agree with this proposition. Many regard public choice as a 
purely theoretical endeavor that has or should have little obvious 
impact on legal policy making, at least at this stage. But Farber and 
Frickey are correct and the critics wrong. Neoclassical economists 
in general have disdained applied economics-and the application 
of economics to legal policy generally takes the form of applied eco-
nomics. If public choice as an enterprise is worth carrying on in 
some sense different than, say, chess is worth carrying on-not 
merely because it is fun and intellectually stimulating, but because it 
helps us to conduct our affairs better-then the admixture of law 
and public choice is inevitable. 
Farber and Frickey's opening illustration suggests one of the 
most pervasive problems in the public choice literature: its uncriti-
cal readiness, even enthusiasm, to accept public choice theories as 
an explanation for certain phenomena without considering the al-
ternatives very seriously. The authors cite a series of studies which 
over an extended period asked people the same question: "Would 
you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests 
looking out for themselves, rather than for the benefit of all the peo-
ple?" In 1964 fewer than one-third answered yes, but by 1982 sixty 
percent did. One might look at that evidence in a variety of ways. 
Farber and Frickey appear to follow the public choice consensus in 
regarding it as proof of a general, increasing cynicism about govern-
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ment, which implicitly reveals the need for some theory to explain 
why government so often works poorly. But there are alternatives. 
For example, one might observe that 1964 was the high point of 
President Lyndon B. Johnson's popularity, while 1982 was mid-way 
through the first Reagan administration. Perhaps people in general 
are more cynical about government during Republican administra-
tions than during Democratic administrations. The numbers also 
say nothing about whether this change in attitude is linear or cycli-
cal. Did we start with some very high number-perhaps at the time 
of the Revolution-which has been declining ever since? Mancur 
Olson's thesis, that nations begin with good government but gradu-
ally fall victim to special interest groups, would suggest this. Alter-
natively, would the numbers have been low after, say, the Teapot 
Dome Scandal and Watergate, but high after Appomattox or the 
end of Franklin D. Roosevelt's first term? 
The numbers also fail to say much about people's perceptions 
with respect to government intervention in the market. 1964 was 
near the high point of regulatory liberalism and the emergent 
"Great Society" of the Kennedy-Johnson years, when the Warren 
Court was in its ascendancy and agency regulation had not yet been 
debunked very much in the popular literature. By 1982 the deregu-
lation movement, which had begun during the Carter administra-
tion, was well underway. Perhaps the cynicism expressed in these 
numbers really expresses a negative reaction to government with-
drawal from certain areas of economic activity-a prominent part 
of Reagan campaign rhetoric-rather than a negative response to 
affirmative government intervention. In short, the numbers may 
prove precisely the opposite of what they are intended to prove. 
Perhaps people as a group feel best about government when it has 
expansive wealth transfer programs whose articulated goals are to 
eliminate poverty, democratize higher education, and eliminate dis-
crimination. On the other hand, they equate deregulation-{)r the 
government withdrawal from certain areas and re-entrustment of 
these to the market-with special interest legislation. 
In a short space Farber and Frickey review the recent history 
of public choice thinking, and then present chapters on the two 
main branches of public choice theory. One branch owes its origins 
to James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock's The Calculus of Con-
sents and Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action,6 and is 
devoted mainly to the study of interest group organizing and activi-
ties, voter behavior, and various phenomena that have become an 
5. U. Mich. Press, 1962. 
6. Harvard U. Press, 1965. 
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almost inherent part of the legislative process, such as log-rolling, 
committees with powerful agenda-setting chairs, and the like. The 
second branch of public choice is commonly identified with Arrow's 
General Possibility Theorem, and is concerned with determining 
mathematically the conditions under which democratic voting can 
produce efficient, stable outcomes. To date, the first branch of pub-
lic choice literature has had a greater impact on policy than the 
Arrovian literature has, and the coverage of this introductory vol-
ume reflects that influence. 
After this presentation, the Farber-Frickey book turns to two 
broad issues where public choice and public law have managed to 
find each other. The first concerns judicial review of economic reg-
ulation. The second is the general issue of statutory interpretation. 
Farber and Frickey discuss the work of a small but influential 
group of legal scholars who are eager to use public choice as the 
basis for a broad revision of the federal constitution. This revision 
would basically reverse the attitude that the Supreme Court has 
taken toward economic regulation since the Court Packing contro-
versy of 1937, and restore a regime of economic scrutiny somewhat 
akin to the regime we know today as the Lochner Era. The vehicle 
of choice for this transformation is not the due process clause as it 
was in Lochner v. New York (1905), however, but most often the 
takings clause of the fifth amendment. Likewise, while the Lochner 
Supreme Court articulated its concerns in terms of a liberty of con-
tract, the central articulated concern today is property rights. 
In brief, public choice theory teaches that small, single-minded 
interest groups will have their way with legislatures and compel spe-
cial interest legislation that will transfer wealth away from others 
for the special interest group's benefit. The purpose of the takings 
clause (as well as some other clauses) of the Constitution is to pre-
vent this from happening. Thus courts should look closely at 
wealth transfers that benefit special interest groups. By contrast, 
"where the beneficiaries [of legislation] are substantially more dif-
fuse than those regulated by a statute," no taking should be found. 
Statutes in this latter category are not likely to be the product of 
rent seeking or special interest capture. 
This public choice approach to the takings clause stands the 
traditional liberal view of government interference with private 
property precisely on its head. Under the traditional theory a court 
considered whether the group victimized by a statute challenged 
under the takings clause was unique (that is, having interests that 
the community at large did not share), and relatively isolated in the 
political process. If so, group members might be branded as the 
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victims of an unconstitutional attempt to transfer wealth away from 
them for the benefit of the public at large, or at least of some larger 
and more powerful interest group. This view of takings jurispru-
dence followed closely the Warren Court's development of the 
equal protection clause to protect "discrete and insular" minorities 
from unjust discrimination at the hands of the majority. The pur-
pose of the takings clause was to "spread the cost of operating the 
governmental apparatus throughout the society rather than impos-
ing it upon some small segment of it. " 7 In short, in liberal takings 
jurisprudence the isolated minority is the victim; in public choice 
jurisprudence the well-defined, small minority becomes the rent-
seeker, who robs the much more diffuse general public of its prop-
erty rights. 
The problem faced by the "applied" legal policy maker is that 
each version of the takings story seems to account for some situa-
tions where we might wish to strike down a statute, and neither 
version accounts for everything. Suppose a city council represent-
ing ten thousand people passes an ordinance preventing any devel-
opment on the land of a half dozen neighboring property owners, in 
order to protect the view from a public park across those property 
owners' land. Would the liberal view (taking) or the public choice 
view (no taking) be more sensible? Suppose the only three apart-
ment building owners in a town lobbied for and obtained an ordi-
nance preventing any further apartment buildings from being built. 
Would the liberal view (no taking) or the public choice view (tak-
ing) be more sensible? Simply put, not all forms of legislation ad-
dressable under the rubric of takings fall into one category or the 
other, although the liberal view seems to explain more recent 
Supreme Court decisions than does the public choice view. Fur-
ther, in many cases a court would likely not be able to distinguish 
one kind of "legislative failure" from the other. 
Farber and Frickey conclude with a fairly deep skepticism 
about the public choice approach to takings clause jurisprudence, 
although for different reasons than those outlined above. They note 
first that the domain of "property rights," which are covered by the 
takings clause, is much narrower than the domain of special interest 
economic regulation. For example, a minimum wage statute might 
qualify as an inefficient, socially harmful acquiescence to a narrow 
special interest group, but it is difficult to attack minimum wage 
statutes under our current conception of the takings clause. Indeed, 
as Farber and Frickey note, any revision of the constitution to for-
bid all inefficient rent-seeking implies judicial review over a domain 
7. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 75-76 (1964). 
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and of an intensity that exceeds the current doctrine by a large or-
der of magnitude. Carried to its logical conclusion, such a view 
would require the near abdication of legislatures and agencies, and 
would result in a form of government by judiciary which we have 
not as yet seen. 
On statutory interpretation, an important public choice story is 
that statutory "intent," particularly insofar as it is contained in offi-
cial legislative history, is largely manufactured. Legislative bodies 
use it to rationalize or disguise what they are doing at least as often 
as they use it to explain a statute's meaning. From this point one 
can develop two different views about how the judge interpreting a 
statute is to proceed. First, he should look to the natural meaning 
of the language itself, and ignore other statements of statutory in-
tent, including legislative history. Alternatively, the judge should 
interpret the statute in such a fashion as to correct its public choice 
biases. Farber and Frickey explore mainly the first; Sunstein's book 
explores mostly the second. 
Farber and Frickey note that the argument for discarding leg-
islative history, Congressional reports, and other sources for a stat-
ute's meaning other than the statutory language itself makes sense, 
if at all, when the statutory language is clear on its face. When that 
language is ambiguous, then the statute may have no meaning apart 
from the expressions of intent manifested in collateral documents. 
In particular, the authors attack Justice Scalia's notion that, while 
statutory language is often drafted in a public-regarding sense, legis-
lators pack reports and other legislative history with all kinds of 
statements favoring the particular special interests that have 
claimed their souls. Justice Scalia apparently thinks this is a daily 
occurrence. Farber and Frickey appear to believe that it virtually 
never happens. One might easily presume the truth to be some-
where in the middle. Likewise, Farber and Frickey's argument that 
the public choice case against legislative history "misfires" when 
statutes are ambiguous does not adequately consider the argument 
that statutory language may sometimes be intentionally made am-
biguous in order to create consensus-the hope being that courts 
will later look to the collateral documents to determine the statute's 
true meaning. 
Farber and Frickey mix an admirable understanding and sym-
pathy for the contributions of public choice scholarship to jurispru-
dence with an appropriate skepticism about public choice's more 
normative and far-ranging conclusions. On the one hand public 
choice scholarship is sophisticated, its models are elegant, and 
much of it seems to describe things that we observe daily in our 
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highly imperfect political process. On the other hand, many public 
choice theories do not stand up well under rigorous empirical test-
ing. Legislatures in fact exhibit far more stability and far less chaos 
than the Arrovian literature predicts. Although the theory of cap-
ture by special interest groups certainly accounts for some statutes, 
it seems quite unable to account for others. The ideology of elected 
representatives continues to be a better predictor of voting behavior 
than economic self-interest or the desire to be re-elected. As Sun-
stein's book tellingly reveals, most of one's attitude toward regula-
tion is predetermined by the baggage, whether liberal or 
neoclassical, that one carries into the process. Public choicers have 
convinced mainly themselves. 
The lack of empirical robustness in the public choice literature 
is critical for the legal policy maker, because he or she is interested 
largely in applied public choice. An elegant model that simply fails 
to account for the data is not of much use to someone who is look-
ing at an existing institution and considering how to change it. 
Both Sunstein and Farber and Frickey take what seems to be the 
correct approach to this problem. If one is going to "apply" public 
choice theory at all in the realm of legislative and agency decision 
making, the application should be at the margin and not the center. 
Nothing that public choice theory has established to date justifies 
the wholesale abdication of legislative regulation in favor of the un-
regulated market, or even a substantial remodeling of our political 
and administrative institutions. What public choice should en-
courage, however, is increased sensitivity to the possibility of cap-
ture and an approach to statutory interpretation designed to make 
statutes reflect, as much as possible consistent with their language, 
public rather than private interests. Farber and Frickey appear to 
agree with this view. They conclude that "public choice can make a 
real ... contribution to the legal system-not at the level of revolu-
tionary new constitutional doctrines, but more modestly, by im-
proving the implementation of existing statutes and the process for 
enacting future legislation." For Farber and Frickey this premise 
yields a case for a modest kind of judicial activism, which they char-
acterize as nothing more than a "sensitivity to the forces that warp 
political outcomes." This should lead judges to enforce "structural 
and procedural constraints on those aspects of the democratic pro-
cess that public choice suggests are most vulnerable to 
malfunction." 
